Quality control plays a critical role in crowdsourcing. The state-of-the-art work is not suitable for large-scale crowdsourcing applications, since it is a long haul for the requestor to verify task quality or select professional workers in a one-by-one mode. In this paper, we propose a misreport- and collusion-proof crowdsourcing mechanism, guiding workers to truthfully report the quality of submitted tasks without collusion by designing a mechanism, so that workers have to act the way the requestor would like. In detail, the mechanism proposed by the requester makes no room for the workers to obtain profit through quality misreport and collusion, and thus, the quality can be controlled without any verification. Extensive simulation results verify the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism. Finally, the importance and originality of our work lie in that it reveals some interesting and even counterintuitive findings: 1) a high-quality worker may pretend to be a low-quality one; 2) the rise of task quality from high-quality workers may not result in the increased utility of the requestor; 3) the utility of the requestor may not get improved with the increasing number of workers. These findings can boost forward looking and strategic planning solutions for crowdsourcing.

中文翻译：

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未经质量验证的防误报和防串通众包机制

质量控制在众包中起着至关重要的作用。最先进的工作不适合大规模的众包应用程序，因为请求者要以一对一的方式验证任务质量或选择专业工人是一个漫长的过程。在本文中，我们提出了一种防误报和防串通的众包机制，通过设计一种机制，引导工人在没有串通的情况下如实报告提交任务的质量，使工人必须按照请求者的意愿行事。具体来说，请求者提出的机制没有让工人通过质量误报和串通获取利润的空间，因此可以在没有任何验证的情况下控制质量。大量的仿真结果验证了所提出机制的有效性。最后，我们工作的重要性和独创性在于它揭示了一些有趣甚至违反直觉的发现：1）一个高素质的工人可能会假装是一个低素质的工人；2) 高素质工人的任务质量的提高可能不会导致请求者的效用增加；3）请求者的效用可能不会随着工人数量的增加而得到改善。这些发现可以促进众包的前瞻性和战略规划解决方案。