Abstract Presence of various stakeholders in water resources management may arise conflicts and intensify the complexity of decision making. To reduce eutrophication potential in a river-reservoir system with discharges from aquaculture industries, an equilibrium strategy-based Multi-Pollutant Waste Load Allocation (MPWLA) program is developed. Proposed MPWLA model links a surrogate to CE-QUAL-W2 water quality model, with artificial neural networks setting, with an evolutionary optimization algorithm in an adaptive surrogate-based Simulation-Optimization framework. Environmental and economic objectives are formulated as fuzzy membership functions to deal with ambiguities and imprecisions in defining the goals of study. To consider the conflicting preferences of stakeholders, (i.e., Iran Department of Environment and aquaculture units), the Stackelberg game is applied and the results are compared with those of Nash Bargaining solution. Performance of the proposed approach is illustrated by its application to Behesht-Abad River-Reservoir system, Iran. Results indicate that application of the model may reduce the eutrophication potential in the Behesht-Abad water body by offering an equilibrium strategy. Comparing two decision-making approaches (Stackelberg and Nash Bargaining) also reveals that the leader in Stackelberg, as fine and constraint setter, benefits from the premier position, leading to higher environmental penalty tariffs, less fish production capacities, and consequently better water quality rather than the Nash bargaining solution.

中文翻译：

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河水库系统可持续水质管理的模糊平衡策略

摘要 水资源管理中各种利益相关者的存在可能会引起冲突并加剧决策的复杂性。为了减少水产养殖业排放的河流水库系统中的富营养化潜力，开发了一个基于平衡策略的多污染物废物负荷分配（MPWLA）计划。提议的 MPWLA 模型将代理链接到 CE-QUAL-W2 水质模型，具有人工神经网络设置，以及基于自适应代理的模拟优化框架中的进化优化算法。环境和经济目标被制定为模糊隶属函数，以处理定义研究目标时的模糊性和不精确性。考虑利益相关者（即伊朗环境部和水产养殖单位）的偏好冲突，应用 Stackelberg 游戏，并将结果与​​ Nash Bargaining 解决方案的结果进行比较。所提议方法的性能通过其在伊朗 Behesht-Abad 河水库系统中的应用得到了说明。结果表明，该模型的应用可以通过提供平衡策略来降低 Behesht-Abad 水体的富营养化潜力。比较两种决策方法（斯塔克尔伯格和纳什讨价还价）还表明，斯塔克尔伯格的领导者作为罚款和约束制定者，受益于首要地位，导致更高的环境罚款关税，更少的鱼类生产能力，从而更好的水质而不是比纳什讨价还价的解决方案。所提议方法的性能通过其在伊朗 Behesht-Abad 河水库系统中的应用得到了说明。结果表明，该模型的应用可以通过提供平衡策略来降低 Behesht-Abad 水体的富营养化潜力。比较两种决策方法（斯塔克尔伯格和纳什讨价还价）还表明，斯塔克尔伯格的领导者作为罚款和约束制定者，受益于首要地位，导致更高的环境罚款关税，更少的鱼类生产能力，从而更好的水质而不是比纳什讨价还价的解决方案。所提议方法的性能通过其在伊朗 Behesht-Abad 河水库系统中的应用得到了说明。结果表明，该模型的应用可以通过提供平衡策略来降低 Behesht-Abad 水体的富营养化潜力。比较两种决策方法（斯塔克尔伯格和纳什讨价还价）还表明，斯塔克尔伯格的领导者作为罚款和约束制定者，受益于首要地位，导致更高的环境罚款关税，更少的鱼类生产能力，从而更好的水质而不是比纳什讨价还价的解决方案。