Most existing models of energy efficiency retrofit are able to evaluate energy saving and retrofit cost for a certain stakeholder, but unable to guide how to allocate retrofit task and incentive among multiple stakeholders. The multistakeholder situation is firstly modeled in the proposed crowdsourcing model (CM), which contributes to quantify the utility of each competitive stakeholder with respect to participation decision. To solve the CM, a Stackelberg game approach is newly developed in this article to find rational and efficient strategies of task/incentive allocation. For the building energy efficiency retrofit, the challenge of CM is to handle mixed-integer decisions of energy service companies. We prove the existence of Stackelberg equilibrium (SE), which introduces the optimal budget, and the Nash equilibrium of task allocation. To compute the SE of CM, effective search algorithms are designed based on best response and optimization techniques. Simulation results have verified the CM and game theoretical approach. The resulted SE has provided stable and efficient strategies of incentive/task allocation.

中文翻译：

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能效改造众包模型与混合整数均衡分析


现有的大部分能效改造模型能够评估某个利益相关者的节能和改造成本，但无法指导如何在多个利益相关者之间分配改造任务和激励。首先在所提出的众包模型（CM）中对多利益相关者情况进行建模，该模型有助于量化每个竞争性利益相关者在参与决策方面的效用。为了解决 CM，本文新开发了 Stackelberg 博弈方法，以寻找合理有效的任务/激励分配策略。对于建筑节能改造，CM 的挑战是处理能源服务公司的混合整数决策。我们证明了引入最优预算的斯塔克伯格均衡（SE）和任务分配的纳什均衡的存在。为了计算 CM 的 SE，我们基于最佳响应和优化技术设计了有效的搜索算法。仿真结果验证了CM和博弈论方法。由此产生的SE提供了稳定有效的激励/任务分配策略。