This article addresses the problem of distributed resilient finite-time control of multiple heterogeneous battery energy storage systems (BESSs) in a microgrid subject to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Note that DoS attacks may block information transmission among BESSs by preventing the BESS from sending data, compromising the devices and jamming a communication network. A distributed secure control framework is presented, where an acknowledgment (ACK)-based attack detection strategy and a communication recovery mechanism are introduced to mitigate the impact of DoS attacks by repairing the paralyzed topology graphs caused by DoS attacks back into the initial connected graph. Under this framework, a distributed resilient finite-time secondary control scheme is proposed such that frequency regulation, active power sharing, and energy level balancing of BESSs can be achieved simultaneously in a finite time; meanwhile, operational constraints can be satisfied at any control transient time. Moreover, based on theoretical analysis, the impact of the duration time of DoS attacks on the convergence time of the control algorithm can be explicitly revealed. Finally, validity and effectiveness of the proposed control scheme are demonstrated by case studies on a modified IEEE 57-bus testing system.

中文翻译：

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拒绝服务攻击下异构电池储能系统的分布式弹性有限时间二次控制


本文解决了微电网中遭受拒绝服务 (DoS) 攻击的多个异构电池储能系统 (BESS) 的分布式弹性有限时间控制问题。请注意，DoS 攻击可能会阻止 BESS 发送数据、损害设备并干扰通信网络，从而阻止 BESS 之间的信息传输。提出了一种分布式安全控制框架，引入基于确认（ACK）的攻击检测策略和通信恢复机制，通过将DoS攻击造成的瘫痪拓扑图修复回初始连通图来减轻DoS攻击的影响。在此框架下，提出了一种分布式弹性有限时间二次控制方案，可以在有限时间内同时实现BESS的频率调节、有功功率共享和能量水平平衡；同时，在任何控制瞬态时间都可以满足操作约束。此外，基于理论分析，可以明确揭示DoS攻击持续时间对控制算法收敛时间的影响。最后，通过对改进的 IEEE 57 总线测试系统的案例研究证明了所提出的控制方案的有效性和有效性。