当前位置: X-MOL 学术arXiv.cs.GT › 论文详情
Price of Anarchy in Bernoulli Congestion Games with Affine Costs
arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory Pub Date : 2019-03-08 , DOI: arxiv-1903.03309
Roberto Cominetti; Marco Scarsini; Marc Schröder; Nicolás Stier-Moses

Since demand in transportation networks is uncertain, commuters need to anticipate different traffic conditions. We capture this uncertainty by assuming that each commuter may make the trip or not with a fixed probability, creating an atomic congestion game with Bernoulli demands. Each commuter participates with an exogenous probability $p_i\in[0,1]$, which is common knowledge, independently of everybody else, or does not travel and incurs no cost. We first prove that the resulting game is potential. Then we compute the parameterized price of anarchy to characterize the impact of demand uncertainty on the efficiency of the transportation network. It turns out that the price of anarchy as a function of the maximum participation probability $p=\max_{i} p_i$ is a nondecreasing function. The worst case is attained when commuters have the same participation probabilities $p_i\equiv p$. For the case of affine costs, we provide an analytic expression for the parameterized price of anarchy as a function of $p$. This function is continuous on $(0,1]$, is equal to $4/3$ for $0
更新日期:2020-03-24

 

全部期刊列表>>
全球疫情及响应:BMC Medicine专题征稿
欢迎探索2019年最具下载量的化学论文
新版X-MOL期刊搜索和高级搜索功能介绍
化学材料学全球高引用
ACS材料视界
南方科技大学
x-mol收录
南方科技大学
自然科研论文编辑服务
上海交通大学彭文杰
中国科学院长春应化所于聪-4-8
武汉工程大学
课题组网站
X-MOL
深圳大学二维材料实验室张晗
中山大学化学工程与技术学院
试剂库存
天合科研
down
wechat
bug