Within this paper, we aim to investigate asymmetries among bidders in land auctions that may entail non-competitive prices. Using representative data for Eastern Germany including winning bids, bidder characteristics, and land amenities, we pursue a structural approach to derive distributions of latent land values for different bidder groups. By applying nonparametric techniques, we cannot find evidence for asymmetric bidder structures while differentiating between legal entities, tenancy status, and nationality of bidders. Our findings challenge the hypothesis that land privatization via auctions discriminates against certain buyer groups—an argument that is often used to justify stricter regulation of agricultural land markets.

中文翻译：

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一价土地拍卖中的农田价值和投标人行为

在本文中，我们旨在调查土地拍卖中可能导致非竞争性价格的投标人之间的不对称。使用东德的代表性数据，包括中标、投标人特征和土地便利设施，我们采用结构化方法来推导出不同投标人群体的潜在土地价值分布。通过应用非参数技术，我们无法在区分法人实体、租赁状态和投标人国籍的同时找到不对称投标人结构的证据。我们的发现挑战了通过拍卖进行土地私有化歧视某些买家群体的假设——这一论点经常被用来证明对农业土地市场进行更严格的监管。