Due to the explosive growth of mobile data traffic, it has become a common practice for Mobile Network Operators (MNOs, also known as operators or carriers) to utilize cellular and WiFi resources simultaneously through mobile data offloading. However, existing offloading technologies are mainly established between operators and third-party WiFi resources, which cannot reflect users dynamic traffic demands. Therefore, MNOs have to design an effective incentive framework, encouraging users to reveal their valuations on resources. In this paper, we propose a novel bid-based Heterogeneous Resources Allocation (HRA) framework. It can enable operators to efficiently utilize both cellular and operator-own WiFi resources simultaneously, where the decision cost of user is strictly controlled. Through auction-based mechanisms, it can achieve dynamic offloading with awareness of users valuations. And the operator-domain offloading effectively avoids anarchy brought by users selfishness and lack of information. More specifically, HRA-Profit and HRA-Utility, are proposed to achieve the maximal profit and social utility, respectively. addition, based on Stochastic Multi-Armed Bandit model, the newly proposed HRA-UCB-Profit and HRA-UCB-Utility are able to gain near-optimal profit and social utility under incomplete user context information. All mechanisms have been proven to be truthful and satisfy individual rationality, while the achieved profit of our mechanism is within a bounded difference from the optimal profit. In addition, the trace-based simulations and evaluations have demonstrated that HRA-Profit and HRA-Utility increase the profit and social utility by up to 40% and 47%, respectively, compared with benchmarks. And the cellular utilization rate is kept at a favorable level under the proposed mechanisms. HRA-UCB-Profit and HRA-UCB-Utility restrict pseudo-regret ratios under 20%.

由于移动数据流量的爆炸性增长，移动网络运营商（MNO，也称为运营商或运营商）通过移动数据卸载同时利用蜂窝和WiFi资源已成为一种惯例。但是，现有的卸载技术主要建立在运营商和第三方WiFi资源之间，无法反映用户的动态流量需求。因此，移动网络运营商必须设计一个有效的激励框架，鼓励用户披露其对资源的估值。在本文中，我们提出了一个新颖的基于出价的异构资源分配（HRA）框架。它可以使运营商同时有效地利用蜂窝和运营商自己的WiFi资源，从而严格控制用户的决策成本。通过基于拍卖的机制，它可以在意识到用户估值的情况下实现动态卸载。而且，运营商域分流可以有效避免用户自私和缺乏信息带来的混乱状态。进一步来说，分别提出了HRA-Profit和HRA-Utility以实现最大利润和社会效用。此外，基于随机多武装强盗模型，新提出的HRA-UCB-Profit和HRA-UCB-Utility在不完整的用户上下文信息下能够获得接近最佳的利润和社会效用。事实证明，所有机制都是真实的并满足个人理性，而我们的机制所获得的利润与最佳利润相差无几。此外，基于跟踪的仿真和评估表明，HRA-Profit和HRA-Utility与基准相比，分别将利润和社会效用分别提高了40％和47％。在所提出的机制下，蜂窝利用率保持在良好的水平。HRA-UCB-Profit和HRA-UCB-Utility将伪后悔率限制在20％以下。