We consider the existence and structure of (zero-sum game) Nash equilibria for a two-way network in the presence of an intelligent jammer capable of tapping the channel signals in both directions. We assume that the source and channel noise signals are all Gaussian random variables, where the source signals are independent of each other, while the noise signals are arbitrarily correlated. We show that for fixed jammer power constraints, a Nash equilibrium exists with respect to the system wide mean square error, and equilibrium jamming policies are always Gaussian. We derive the equilibrium policies in closed form under various system parameters. Finally for two system scenarios, we analytically determine the optimal power allocation levels the jammer can deploy in each channel link, when allowed to operate under an overall power constraint.

中文翻译：

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具有干扰和分散控制的双向高斯网络

在智能干扰器的存在下，我们考虑了双向网络（零和博弈）纳什均衡的存在和结构，该智能干扰器能够在两个方向上窃听信道信号。我们假设源和通道噪声信号都是高斯随机变量，其中源信号彼此独立，而噪声信号是任意相关的。我们表明，对于固定的干扰功率约束，相对于系统范围的均方误差存在纳什均衡，并且均衡干扰策略始终为高斯。我们在各种系统参数下以封闭形式导出均衡策略。最后，对于两个系统方案，当允许其在整体功率约束下运行时，我们分析确定干扰器可以在每个通道链路中部署的最佳功率分配水平。