Remanufacturing capacities are constrained by the collected amount of end-of-life (EOL) products resulting in the make-from-stock model for remanufacturing industries. Remanufacturers may select quality choices in a strategic manner to improve their remanufacturing capacities. Thus, we examine a Cournot duopoly in which an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) sells new products and an independent remanufacturer (IR) remanufactures EOL products, and we determine the production quantities of low- and high-quality remanufactured products. The IR can select pure low-quality, pure high-quality, or mixed-quality policies. We formulate the dynamics between the OEM and IR in a two-period game, solve for the firms’ equilibrium quantities through dynamic programming, and derive the conditions of the remanufacturing-quality policies. Furthermore, we characterize the firms’ equilibrium decisions and analyze the parametric effects on profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare. When the availability of EOL products is sufficient, a high-quality policy is the dominant strategy for the IR and is also beneficial to both the OEM and consumers in most cases. However, when the amount of EOL products is not sufficient, the IR may choose to reduce the average quality level to obtain ample capacity; this situation is beneficial to consumers but harmful to the OEM.

再制造能力受到报废（EOL）产品数量的限制，从而导致了再制造行业的按库存制造模型。再制造商可以以战略方式选择质量选择，以提高其再制造能力。因此，我们研究了古诺（Cournot）寡头垄断，其中原始设备制造商（OEM）销售新产品，而独立再制造商（IR）再制造EOL产品，并确定低质量和高质量再制造产品的生产量。IR可以选择纯低质量，纯高质量或混合质量策略。我们在两个时期的博弈中制定了OEM与IR之间的动态关系，通过动态规划来解决企业的均衡数量，并推导了再制造质量政策的条件。此外，我们表征企业的均衡决策，并分析其对利润，消费者剩余和社会福利的参数影响。当EOL产品的可用性足够时，高质量的策略是IR的主要策略，并且在大多数情况下也对OEM和消费者都有利。但是，当停产的产品数量不足时，IR可能会选择降低平均质量水平以获得足够的容量；这种情况对消费者有利，但对OEM有害。当EOL产品数量不足时，IR可能会选择降低平均质量水平以获得足够的容量；这种情况对消费者有利，但对OEM不利。当EOL产品数量不足时，IR可能会选择降低平均质量水平以获得足够的容量；这种情况对消费者有利，但对OEM不利。