The implementation of cost leadership strategy can enable enterprises to obtain a lasting competitive advantage. In this paper, we construct a supply chain with two competing suppliers and two competing manufacturers. The suppliers act as the Stackelberg leaders, selling components to the follower manufacturers. The manufacturers use different sourcing strategies, one of which only uses the reliable supplier, while another adopts contingent dual sourcing. We derive the analytical form of the equilibrium solution of order quantities of manufacturers and wholesale prices of suppliers in different scenarios and compare the decision differences when reliable supplier stays in different game positions. We further investigate the impact of different cooperation contract between the manufacturer who adopts dual sourcing and unreliable supplier on the procurement and pricing strategies by numerical experiments. The results illustrate that reliable supplier acts as the Stackelberg leader are more beneficial to suppliers. Manufacturer with dual sourcing can work with the unreliable supplier by revenue sharing contract to achieve a win–win situation.

实施成本领先战略可以使企业获得持久的竞争优势。在本文中，我们构建了一个由两个相互竞争的供应商和两个相互竞争的制造商组成的供应链。供应商充当Stackelberg的领导者，将组件出售给跟随者制造商。制造商采用不同的采购策略，其中一种仅使用可靠的供应商，而另一种则采用偶发性双重采购。我们推导了在不同情况下制造商的订货量与供应商的批发价格之间的均衡解的分析形式，并比较了可靠供应商停留在不同博弈位置时的决策差异。我们通过数值实验进一步研究了采用双重采购的制造商与不可靠的供应商之间不同的合作合同对采购和定价策略的影响。结果表明，可靠的供应商作为Stackelberg的领导者对供应商更有利。具有双重采购的制造商可以通过收益共享合同与不可靠的供应商合作，以实现双赢。