Abstract

Because governments have introduced policies involving incentives and penalties to promote the recycling of plastic waste, it is important to understand the impact of such incentives and penalties on the willingness of stakeholders to participate. In this study, government is included as a player, alongside waste collectors and recyclers, in a tripartite evolutionary game model of plastic waste recycling. The study explores the evolutionary equilibrium and performs a simulation analysis to elucidate the effect of government incentives and penalties on the willingness of other players to participate in recycling. Three conclusions are drawn from this research. First, an increase in incentives or in penalties increases the probability that collectors and recyclers will participate in the recycling process. Second, policy support incentives encourage collectors and recyclers to participate in plastic waste recycling earlier than subsidy incentives do. Finally, recyclers are more sensitive than collectors to government-imposed penalties.

中文翻译：

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政府奖励措施和罚款对回收塑料废料的意愿的影响：进化博弈论的观点

摘要

由于政府已经出台了涉及鼓励和惩罚措施的政策，以促进塑料废物的回收利用，因此了解此类奖励和惩罚措施对利益相关者参与意愿的影响非常重要。在这项研究中，政府与废品收集者和回收者一道被纳入了废塑料回收的三方进化博弈模型中。该研究探索了进化均衡，并进行了模拟分析，以阐明政府激励措施和罚款对其他参与者参与回收的意愿的影响。这项研究得出三个结论。首先，激励措施或罚款的增加会增加收集者和回收者参与回收过程的可能性。第二，政策支持激励措施鼓励收集者和回收者比补贴激励措施更早地参与塑料废物的回收利用。最后，对于政府施加的罚款，回收者比收集者更敏感。