Evidence suggests that firms which use customer data analytics perform better than those that do not. However, the current policy of voluntary profiling allows firms to collect and use customer information only if customers voluntarily disclose information with them. Further, surveys and literature show that many customers are not comfortable with firms collecting their information due to privacy concerns. A vast literature has examined customer information disclosing behavior using the privacy calculus. The primary premise of the privacy calculus is that despite strong privacy concerns, customers disclose information if the benefits they can get from disclosure justify the costs of losing privacy, or privacy costs. Based on the privacy calculus, firms and marketers believe that customers voluntarily disclose information in exchange for monetary benefits such as discount coupons or cash rewards. Using transaction data that we collected from a firm that sells skin care cosmetic products on its website, we investigate if there is statistical evidence that shows customers disclose information in exchange for monetary benefits. In line with the privacy calculus, we find that customers with low privacy costs and that expect high benefits from personalized services such as product recommendations are more likely to disclose information. Monetary incentives only work as an effective means to elicit information from customers in the age range of 12–21 years old. Customers, on average, and especially customers in the age range of 22–54 years old are not likely to disclose information simply as a tradeoff for monetary benefits. Personalized services outweigh monetary benefits in enticing these customers to disclose information.

有证据表明，使用客户数据分析的公司的业绩要优于未使用客户数据分析的公司。但是，当前的自愿配置文件政策仅在客户自愿向其披露信息时才允许公司收集和使用客户信息。此外，调查和文献表明，由于隐私问题，许多客户不满意公司收集其信息。大量文献使用隐私演算检查了客户信息披露行为。隐私演算的主要前提是，尽管存在强烈的隐私担忧，但客户从信息披露中获得的收益是否足以证明丧失隐私的成本或隐私成本，还是可以披露信息。根据隐私演算，公司和营销人员认为，客户自愿披露信息以换取诸如优惠券或现金奖励之类的金钱利益。使用我们从其网站上销售护肤化妆品的公司收集的交易数据，我们调查是否有统计证据表明客户披露信息以换取金钱利益。根据隐私计算，我们发现隐私成本较低且希望从个性化服务（例如产品推荐）中获得高收益的客户更有可能披露信息。货币激励措施仅是一种有效的手段，可以从12-21岁的年龄段的客户那里获取信息。平均而言，客户 尤其是22-54岁年龄段的客户不太可能仅仅为了权衡金钱利益而披露信息。个性化服务在诱使这些客户披露信息方面胜于金钱利益。