Abstract Cloud computing services are examples of platforms in the classic sense of the economics of two-sided markets. In particular, indirect externalities arise in the cloud from connecting users with developers of complementary products or services. The premise investigated here is that a cloud provider's security is subject to the same rigors of two-sided market competition that shape a cloud provider's pricing and strategy. In so doing, this study demonstrates how cybersecurity shapes cloud competition and cloud competition shapes cybersecurity. Specifically, cybersecurity is shown to be a user-side phenomenon with characteristics that can lead to the coexistence of cloud services providers rather than monopoly. In addition, a user's switching costs are characterized in terms of the ratio of the potential consequence of a class break under a user's current provider against that of the competition. Finally, a component of cybersecurity is identified for which there is no technical solution.

中文翻译：

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云中的网络安全和平台竞争

摘要 云计算服务是双边市场经济学经典意义上的平台示例。特别是，云中的间接外部性来自将用户与互补产品或服务的开发者联系起来。此处调查的前提是，云提供商的安全性受制于影响云提供商定价和战略的严格的两侧市场竞争。通过这样做，本研究展示了网络安全如何塑造云竞争，而云竞争又如何塑造网络安全。具体而言，网络安全被证明是一种用户端现象，其特征可能导致云服务提供商的共存而不是垄断。此外，用户' s 转换成本的特征在于用户当前提供商与竞争者的分类中断的潜在后果之比。最后，确定了没有技术解决方案的网络安全组件。