This paper considers an auction-based parking reservation problem where a parking management platform is the auctioneer and the drivers are bidders. The platform is in charge of multiple homogeneous parking spaces. A winner may leave earlier or occupy the parking space longer than the time he has reserved. The phenomena are known as (ex post) demand disturbances, which can occur only after the last auction terminates. The platform may penalize or compensate a driver who causes demand disturbance. Besides, investigation is conducted into three types of driver behaviors, namely, gain/loss neutrality, loss aversion, and gain seeking, and the reference effects are examined. An effective multi-stage Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (MS-VCG) auction mechanism is raised. Expect for the disturbance makers, the MS-VCG auction is capable to achieve allocative efficiency, incentive compatibility, and individual rationality. As shown by computational results, in the absence of reference effect, both penalty and compensation rise with the number of bidders. If drivers are gain/loss neutral, the average utility of winners reaches the highest, while the penalty and compensation reach the lowest, as compared to loss-averse and gain-seeking drivers. The total VCG payment received by the auctioneer increases with the reference price. Finally, based on our proposed model, the platform has the ability to deal with the demand disturbances by holding a certain number of parking spaces that are not auctioned for reservation.

本文考虑了一个基于拍卖的停车预约问题，其中一个停车管理平台是拍卖人，而驾驶员是投标人。该平台负责多个同质停车位。优胜者可能比其保留时间更早离开或占用停车空间。这种现象被称为（事后）需求扰动，只有在最后一次拍卖终止后才会发生。平台可能会惩罚或补偿造成需求干扰的驾驶员。此外，对驾驶员行为的三种类型进行了调查，即收益/损失中立，损失厌恶和寻求收益。，并检查参考效果。提出了一种有效的多阶段维克雷-克拉克-格罗夫（MS-VCG）拍卖机制。对于扰动者，MS-VCG拍卖能够实现分配效率，激励兼容性和个人理性。如计算结果所示，在没有参考效果的情况下，罚款和补偿都随着投标人数量的增加而增加。如果驾驶员是损益中性的，则与避免损失和寻求收益的驾驶员相比，获胜者的平均效用达到最高，而惩罚和补偿则达到最低。拍卖师收到的VCG总付款随着参考价格的增加而增加。最后，根据我们提出的模型，