Mathematically-secure cryptographic algorithms leak significant side channel information through their power supplies when implemented on a physical platform. These side channel leakages can be exploited by an attacker to extract the secret key of an embedded device. The existing state-of-the-art countermeasures mainly focus on the power balancing, gate-level masking, or signal-to-noise (SNR) reduction using noise injection and signature attenuation, all of which suffer either from the limitations of high power/area overheads, performance degradation or are not synthesizable. In this article, we propose a generic low-overhead digital-friendly power SCA countermeasure utilizing physical Time-Varying Transfer Functions (TVTF) by randomly shuffling distributed switched capacitors to significantly obfuscate the traces in the time domain. System-level simulation results of the TVTF-AES implemented in TSMC 65nm CMOS technology show > 4000x MTD improvement over the unprotected implementation with nearly 1.25x power and 1.2x area overheads, and without any performance degradation.

中文翻译：

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作为通用低开销 Power-SCA 对策的物理时变传递函数

在物理平台上实施时，数学上安全的加密算法会通过其电源泄漏重要的侧信道信息。攻击者可以利用这些侧信道泄漏来提取嵌入式设备的密钥。现有最先进的对策主要集中在使用噪声注入和特征衰减的功率平衡、门级屏蔽或信噪比 (SNR) 降低，所有这些都受到高功率限制/area 开销、性能下降或不可综合。在本文中，我们提出了一种通用的低开销数字友好型电源 SCA 对策，它利用物理时变传递函数 (TVTF)，通过随机混洗分布式开关电容器来显着混淆时域中的迹线。