Abstract Secondary market where used or refurbished products are traded has attracted many independent refurbishers (IRs) to engage in refurbishing. It poses competitions for new product sales of the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and presents new market opportunities for OEMs as well. Many OEMs have adopted refurbishing authorization as one form of cooperation. As a result, it is common that authorized refurbished products and non-authorized refurbished products coexist in the secondary market. This paper investigates a supply chain consisting of an OEM and two competing IRs. To this end, we model the decision-making processing of the OEM and two IRs as a Stackelberg game. We provide the conditions for the OEM to implement refurbishing authorization and for IRs to accept authorization. We identify that the critical trade-off is whether the indirect benefit from refurbishing authorization, such as authorization fee, can outweigh the direct cannibalization effect of the sales of refurbished products on new products sales. The comparative analyses show that the OEM can benefit from the secondary market only when the IRs gain enough profit from authorized refurbishment, and a high authorization fee is not always beneficial for the OEM.

中文翻译：

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二级市场竞争对翻新授权策略的影响

摘要 二手或翻新产品交易的二级市场吸引了许多独立的翻新商（IR）从事翻新。它对原始设备制造商 (OEM) 的新产品销售构成了竞争，也为 OEM 提供了新的市场机会。许多 OEM 已将翻新授权作为一种合作形式。因此，在二级市场上，授权的翻新产品和非授权的翻新产品并存是很常见的。本文研究了一个由 OEM 和两个相互竞争的 IR 组成的供应链。为此，我们将 OEM 和两个 IR 的决策过程建模为 Stackelberg 游戏。我们为OEM实施翻新授权和IR接受授权提供条件。我们认为关键的权衡是翻新授权的间接收益（例如授权费）是否可以超过翻新产品销售对新产品销售的直接蚕食效应。比较分析表明，只有当 IR 从授权翻新中获得足够的利润时，OEM 才能从二级市场中受益，而高授权费并不总是对 OEM 有利。