Regarding m-consciousness, Nagel (1974) claimed that an organism possesses this extra essence (that is, subjectivity) if there is something it is like to be that organism—something it is like, for example, to be human and experience pain or yellow afterimages. Similarly, Block (2007) claimed, “the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state” (p. 227). As noted by Graziano and colleagues, scientists operating from the traditional perspective have been incapable of having an inkling regarding, not only how something like subjectivity could arise from something like the brain, but how subjectivity could ever emerge from any set of real or hypothetical circumstances. Shallice (1972) concludes, “The problem of consciousness occupies an analogous position for cognitive psychology as the problem of language behaviour does for behaviourism, namely, an unsolved anomaly within the domain of the approach” (p. 383). Graziano and colleagues propose that, from their untraditional perspective, the problem of m-consciousness can be explained. It is worth reiterating that most theories of consciousness do not attempt to explain m-consciousness. The fact that AST not only attempts to tackle this daunting puzzle but also provides a possible answer to it is a momentous achievement. We believe that AST—with its untraditional standpoint, explanatory power, and unique insights—might also explain two longstanding questions concerning m-consciousness. Before posing the two questions, we must first define some terms and concepts. The entirety of one’s subjective experience, also called the conscious field (Freeman, 2004; Köhler, 1947; Searle, 2000), is composed of all that one is aware of at onemoment in time. Each thing in the conscious field is a conscious content (e.g., nausea, pain, the colour white, the smell of lavender, the urge to sneeze; Merker, 2007). As noted in AST, conscious contents do not exist in the physical world, at least not in the way that we experience them: “... the visual system models white light as brightness without any contaminating colors—a simplification of a more complex physical reality.” Conscious contents are as contrived as the icons that, on a radar screen, represent a cloud versus a plane. Basic percepts such as the colour white, the smell of coffee, and pitch (e.g., the lowest note on a piano) are constructions that are simplified, caricature-like representations of the physical things they represent (Levitin, 2007). (Levitin [2007] proposes that, in the auditory system, the perception of pitch is a construction—similar to the perception of the colour white—that is far different in nature from the physical stimulus it represents.) As noted by Lashley (1923), the simplest forms of conscious contents (e.g., hue) are unanalyzable:

中文翻译：

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有意识的内容：它们不可分析的、任意的和任意的属性

关于 m 意识，Nagel (1974) 声称，如果有机体有某种东西，它就拥有这种额外的本质（即主观性）——例如，它就像是人类并经历痛苦或黄色残像。类似地，Block (2007) 声称，“一种状态的现象意识方面是处于那种状态时的感觉”（p. 227）。正如 Graziano 及其同事所指出的那样，从传统观点出发的科学家们无法预知主观性如何从大脑等事物中产生，而且主观性如何从任何一组真实或假设的环境中出现. Shallice (1972) 总结道，“意识问题在认知心理学中的地位与语言行为问题在行为主义中的地位类似，即该方法领域内未解决的异常现象”（第 383 页）。Graziano 及其同事提出，从他们的非传统角度来看，m 意识问题是可以解释的。值得重申的是，大多数意识理论并不试图解释 m-意识。事实上，AST 不仅试图解决这个令人生畏的难题，而且还提供了可能的答案，这是一项重大成就。我们相信 AST——以其非传统的立场、解释力和独特的见解——也可以解释关于 m-意识的两个长期存在的问题。在提出这两个问题之前，我们必须先定义一些术语和概念。一个人的整个主观体验，也称为意识场（Freeman, 2004; Köhler, 1947; Searle, 2000），是由一个人在某个时刻意识到的所有事物组成的。意识领域中的每件事都是有意识的内容（例如，恶心、疼痛、白色、薰衣草的气味、打喷嚏的冲动；Merker，2007）。正如 AST 所指出的，有意识的内容不存在于物理世界中，至少在我们体验它们的方式中不存在：“……视觉系统将白光建模为没有任何污染颜色的亮度——对更复杂的物理的简化现实。” 有意识的内容就像雷达屏幕上代表云与平面的图标一样人为设计。诸如白色、咖啡的气味和音高（例如，钢琴上的最低音符）等基本感知是经过简化的结构，它们代表的物理事物的漫画式表示（Levitin，2007）。（Levitin [2007] 提出，在听觉系统中，音高的感知是一种结构——类似于对白色的感知——本质上与其所代表的物理刺激大不相同。）正如 Lashley (1923) 所指出的)，意识内容的最简单形式（例如，色调）是无法分析的：