The focus of this paper is the requirement that the use of live animals in experiments and in vivo assays should never be allowed if those uses involve severe suffering. This requirement was first implemented in Danish legislation, was later adopted by the European Union, and has had limited uptake in North America. Animal suffering can arise from exposure to a wide range of different external and internal events that threaten biological or social functions, while the severity of suffering may be influenced by the animals’ perceptions of their own situation and the degree of control they are able to exert. Severe suffering is more than an incremental increase in negative state(s) but involves a qualitative shift whereby the normal mechanisms to contain or keep negative states at arm’s length no longer function. The result of severe suffering will be a loss of the ability of cope. The idea of putting a cap on severe suffering may be justified from multiple ethical perspectives. In most, if not all, cases it is possible to avoid imposing severe suffering on animals during experiments without giving up the potential benefits of finding new ways to cure, prevent, or alleviate serious human diseases and generate other important knowledge. From this it follows that there is a strong ethical case to favor a regulatory ban on animal experiments involving severe suffering.

中文翻译：

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从不愉快到难以忍受——为什么以及如何在动物研究中对疼痛和其他形式的痛苦实施上限

本文的重点是要求在实验和体内分析中使用活体动物，如果这些使用涉及严重的痛苦，则不应允许这些使用。这一要求首先在丹麦立法中实施，后来被欧盟采用，并且在北美受到限制。动物的痛苦可能来自于暴露于威胁生物或社会功能的各种不同的外部和内部事件，而痛苦的严重程度可能受到动物对自身情况的看法以及它们能够施加的控制程度的影响. 严重的痛苦不仅仅是消极状态的增量增加，而是涉及质的转变，即控制或保持消极状态的正常机制不再起作用。严重痛苦的结果将是丧失应对能力。从多个伦理角度来看，限制严重痛苦的想法可能是合理的。在大多数（如果不是全部）情况下，可以避免在实验期间对动物造成严重痛苦，同时又不放弃寻找治疗、预防或减轻严重人类疾病的新方法以及产生其他重要知识的潜在好处。由此可见，有一个强有力的伦理理由支持对涉及严重痛苦的动物实验进行监管禁令。在不放弃寻找治疗、预防或缓解严重人类疾病的新方法以及产生其他重要知识的潜在好处的情况下，可以避免在实验期间对动物造成严重痛苦。由此可见，有一个强有力的伦理理由支持对涉及严重痛苦的动物实验进行监管禁令。在不放弃寻找治疗、预防或缓解严重人类疾病的新方法以及产生其他重要知识的潜在好处的情况下，可以避免在实验期间对动物造成严重痛苦。由此可见，有一个强有力的伦理理由支持对涉及严重痛苦的动物实验进行监管禁令。