In the shipping industry, forwarders can purchase a “one-stop” service from an ocean shipping (OS) company or a dual “ocean + inland” service from an OS company and an individual inland shipping (IS) company. Additionally, the OS company can strategically decide whether or not to enter the downstream market for cargo-canvassing, which will form a co-opetition relationship with incumbent forwarders. We investigate a strategy matrix based on the following two questions: “What kind of shipping service should be purchased by the forwarder?” “Is it beneficial for OS company to enter the market?” We find that when the forwarder’s cargo-canvassing effort level is low, a dual-service purchasing strategy will benefit both the stakeholders, while market-entry is a self-interested behavior and hurts the forwarder. Enhancing the cargo-canvassing effort level may help the forwarder to overcome this dilemma. However, with an increasing level of effort, there is a mutual inhibition of dual-service purchasing and market-entry, which hurts both the stakeholders’ profits simultaneously. Interestingly, we show that a win-win situation exists when the forwarder adopts a dual-service purchasing strategy without market-entry. Furthermore, we verify that this win-win situation is Pareto-optimized.

在航运业中，货运代理可以从远洋运输（OS）公司购买“一站式”服务，也可以从远洋运输公司和内陆航运（IS）公司购买“海洋+内陆”双重服务。此外，操作系统公司可以战略性地决定是否进入下游市场进行货物装箱，这将与现有货运代理形成竞合关系。我们基于以下两个问题调查策略矩阵：“货运代理应购买哪种运输服务？” “对于OS公司进入市场是否有利？” 我们发现，当货运代理的货物装卸工作量较低时，双重服务的购买策略将使双方都受益，而进入市场是一种自私的行为，会伤害货运代理。加强货物装卸工作量的水平可以帮助货运代理克服这一难题。但是，随着努力水平的提高，双重服务购买和市场进入相互抑制，这同时损害了利益相关者的利益。有趣的是，我们表明，如果货运代理人采取无市场进入的双重服务购买策略，则存在双赢局面。此外，我们验证了这种双赢局面是帕累托优化的。