This article introduces a novel (environmental) interpretation of a “Keynesian coordination game” and develops four potential scenarios to remaining within a global carbon emissions constraint. With inspiration from research on “ecologically unequal exchange” (EUE), we demonstrate the drawbacks of present “green growth” strategies by considering how pollution- and resource-intensive industries are distributed unevenly in the world economy, with large and increasing negative impacts on the periphery. The situation may only be exacerbated if the reduction of emissions in the center is based on shifting heavy industries and extractive enterprises to low-cost producers in the periphery. In this way, existing research likely overemphasizes the capacity of “green” investment policy to achieve sustainable outcomes. Our scenarios show that achieving global sustainability and improving global equity will require an impressive level of coordination between the center and periphery, as well as a significant reduction in the rate of growth (“degrowth”) in the center.

中文翻译：

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开放经济中的生态宏观经济学：中心-边缘模型中的可持续性、不平等交换和政策协调

本文介绍了对“凯恩斯主义协调博弈”的新颖（环境）解释，并开发了四种可能的情景，以保持在全球碳排放约束范围内。受“生态不平等交换”（EUE）研究的启发，我们通过考虑污染和资源密集型产业在世界经济中的分布不均，对全球经济产生巨大且日益增加的负面影响，证明了当前“绿色增长”战略的弊端。外围。如果中心的减排基于将重工业和采掘企业转移到外围的低成本生产商，这种情况可能只会加剧。这样，现有研究可能过分强调“绿色”投资政策实现可持续成果的能力。