Consider a supply chain with a supplier selling to downstream competing manufacturers who purchase demand information from a third-party information provider. We show that the equilibrium number of manufacturers who purchase the information service depends only on the downstream competition intensity. We further investigate two contract schemes: wholesale price and index-based price. We find that the latter benefits the supplier but causes the information accuracy and service price to depreciate, thereby reducing the information provider’s profit. Finally, we provide guidance to the supplier on when it should rely on a third-party information provider instead of offering information service in house.

考虑一个供应链，其中供应商向下游竞争的制造商出售产品，这些制造商从第三方信息提供商那里购买需求信息。我们表明，购买信息服务的制造商的均衡数量仅取决于下游竞争强度。我们进一步研究了两种合同方案：批发价和基于指数的价。我们发现后者使供应商受益，但导致信息准确性和服务价格贬值，从而降低了信息提供商的利润。最后，我们为供应商何时应该依赖第三方信息提供商而不是内部提供信息服务提供指导。