Abstract In this research, we primarily aim at investigating whether take-back regulation encourages remanufacturing (as a preferred product recovery option) or Eco-design. For this purpose, we assume a manufacturer that produces and distributes a single product, which is regulated by a take-back environmental regulation imposed by a regulator seeking social welfare maximization. At time zero, the regulator decides about either imposing or not imposing a take-back regulation; and if take-back regulation is imposed, the level of penalty for not collecting the products. Subsequently, the manufacturer decides about either remanufacturing the product or investing on designing a greener product. The latter is particularly of interest as the amount of hazardous materials in uncollected products directly contributes to environment damage. Upon deciding on how to respond to the regulation, optimal remanufacturing quantity or emission reduction is determined. Based on the obtained sub-game perfect equilibria, a set of guidelines are proposed to regulators and manufacturers. Among the proposed policies, we highlight that if Eco-design can sufficiently reduce production cost, no take-back regulation is necessary for a more polluting product, while one is required for a greener product. For a costly Eco-design, however, a regulated manufacturer practices remanufacturing.

中文翻译：

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回收监管：再制造还是生态设计？

摘要 在这项研究中，我们主要旨在调查回收监管是否鼓励再制造（作为首选的产品回收选项）或生态设计。为此，我们假设一家生产和分销单一产品的制造商，该产品受到寻求社会福利最大化的监管机构实施的回收环境法规的监管。在零时刻，监管机构决定实施或不实施收回监管；如果实施收回规定，则不收集产品的处罚水平。随后，制造商决定是重新制造产品还是投资设计更环保的产品。后者尤其令人感兴趣，因为未收集产品中有害物质的数量会直接导致环境破坏。在决定如何应对监管后，确定最佳再制造数量或减排量。基于获得的子博弈完美均衡，向监管机构和制造商提出了一套指导方针。在拟议的政策中，我们强调，如果生态设计能够充分降低生产成本，那么污染更严重的产品不需要回收监管，而绿色产品则需要回收监管。然而，对于成本高昂的生态设计，受监管的制造商进行再制造。我们强调，如果生态设计能够充分降低生产成本，那么污染更严重的产品就不需要回收监管，而更环保的产品则需要回收监管。然而，对于成本高昂的生态设计，受监管的制造商进行再制造。我们强调，如果生态设计能够充分降低生产成本，那么污染更严重的产品就不需要回收监管，而更环保的产品则需要回收监管。然而，对于成本高昂的生态设计，受监管的制造商进行再制造。