Abstract Suppliers' insufficient capital can disrupt the normal operations of other participants in the supply chain. To alleviate suppliers' capital constraints, retailers have the option of providing financing. However, when addressing the risks of default, retailers should behave conservatively and sensitively, which results in loss-averse behaviors. Using a game theoretical approach, this study examines and compares two financing schemes available to loss-averse retailers: loan and investment. We find that both schemes bring additional value to the loss-averse retailer and the capital-constrained supplier, providing a win–win situation. An appropriate interest rate or proportional dividend is the prerequisite for both participants to adopt a loan or an investment scheme, respectively. For the loan scheme, the retailer's higher loss aversion causes him to reduce the wholesale price. In the investment scheme, a higher loss aversion reduces production quantity. We locate the Pareto improvement regions of the two schemes for both participants using comparative analysis. The retailer's higher loss aversion causes both participants to have lower chances of achieving Pareto improvements from supply chain financing. When the retailer is more loss averse and the supplier is highly capital constrained, both participants prefer an investment rather than the loan scheme. This study provides implications for participants adopting particular financing schemes to enhance profits and reduce risk.

中文翻译：

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厌恶损失的零售商向资本受限的供应商提供金融产品：贷款与投资

摘要 供应商资金不足会扰乱供应链其他参与者的正常运作。为了缓解供应商的资金限制，零售商可以选择提供融资。然而，在应对违约风险时，零售商应采取保守和敏感的行为，这会导致损失厌恶行为。本研究使用博弈论方法检查并比较了两种可用于厌恶损失的零售商的融资计划：贷款和投资。我们发现这两种方案都为厌恶损失的零售商和资本受限的供应商带来了额外的价值，提供了双赢的局面。适当的利率或比例股息是两个参与者分别采用贷款或投资计划的先决条件。对于贷款计划，零售商的 更高的损失厌恶导致他降低批发价格。在投资方案中，较高的损失厌恶减少了生产数量。我们使用比较分析为两个参与者定位了两个方案的帕累托改进区域。零售商较高的损失厌恶导致双方参与者通过供应链融资实现帕累托改进的机会较低。当零售商更厌恶损失而供应商的资本受到高度限制时，两个参与者都更喜欢投资而不是贷款计划。本研究为采用特定融资计划以提高利润和降低风险的参与者提供了启示。我们使用比较分析为两个参与者定位了两个方案的帕累托改进区域。零售商较高的损失厌恶导致双方参与者通过供应链融资实现帕累托改进的机会较低。当零售商更厌恶损失而供应商的资本受到高度限制时，两个参与者都更喜欢投资而不是贷款计划。本研究为采用特定融资计划以提高利润和降低风险的参与者提供了启示。我们使用比较分析为两个参与者定位了两个方案的帕累托改进区域。零售商较高的损失厌恶导致双方参与者通过供应链融资实现帕累托改进的机会较低。当零售商更厌恶损失而供应商的资本受到高度限制时，两个参与者都更喜欢投资而不是贷款计划。本研究为采用特定融资计划以提高利润和降低风险的参与者提供了启示。两个参与者都更喜欢投资而不是贷款计划。本研究为采用特定融资计划以提高利润和降低风险的参与者提供了启示。两个参与者都更喜欢投资而不是贷款计划。本研究为采用特定融资计划以提高利润和降低风险的参与者提供了启示。