Wide-area control helps damp the inter-area oscillations in modern power systems. However, compared to traditional local control, it is more vulnerable to cyber attacks due to its dependence on remote real-time-communicated measurements. In this paper, a formal mathematical framework for analyzing resilience of various wide-area controllers under adversarial scenarios is proposed. A novel resilience index based on the $\mathcal {H}_2$ norm of the post-attack closed-loop system is defined. Computation of such an index is, in general, challenging due to the combinatorial nature of the attack profiles and the bilinear nature of the problem. To address these difficulties, a gradient-based path-following-like solution is developed in this paper to solve a relaxed version of the original non-convex problem. Case studies on IEEE 39-bus system are performed to demonstrate the usage of the proposed framework.

中文翻译：

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电力系统广域控制弹性分析和量化框架

广域控制有助于抑制现代电力系统中的区域间振荡。然而，与传统的本地控制相比，它更容易受到网络攻击，因为它依赖于远程实时通信测量。在本文中，提出了一个正式的数学框架，用于分析对抗性场景下各种广域控制器的弹性。定义了基于攻击后闭环系统的 $\mathcal {H}_2$ 范数的新型弹性指数。由于攻击配置文件的组合性质和问题的双线性性质，这种指数的计算通常具有挑战性。为了解决这些困难，本文开发了一种基于梯度的路径跟随解决方案来解决原始非凸问题的宽松版本。