Prosumers, with ability to act both as a supplier and a consumer in a power market, have received considerable attention recently. Possessing with distributed energy resources, their capability to operate in an isolated mode, shielding from the main grid, has also been promoted as a vital option to enhance the power system's resilience. One emerging concern is the prosumer's ability to manipulate the power market as a buyer or as a seller. This study vets the outcomes of a power market in presence of strategic prosumers. We formulate the optimization problem faced by the prosumers in a complementarity problem. We posit a situation in which a strategic prosumer owns a renewable unit with variant output and a dispatchable backup unit, and participates in a competitive market. The prosumer is assumed to maximize its benefit by deciding amount of power to buy from or sell into the main grid, amount of renewable power to forego consumption, and amount of power to produce from backup unit. The model is applied to a case study of the IEEE 24-bus RTS as an illustrative example. We summarize the model properties and findings in three propositions and report distributional impacts of economic rent among conventional suppliers and consumers.

中文翻译：

---

存在战略产消者的电力市场模型

有能力在电力市场中充当供应商和消费者的产消者最近受到了相当大的关注。拥有分布式能源，它们在隔离模式下运行的能力，与主电网屏蔽，也被推广为增强电力系统弹性的重要选择。一个新出现的问题是产消者作为买方或卖方操纵电力市场的能力。本研究审查了存在战略产消者的电力市场的结果。我们在互补问题中制定了产消者面临的优化问题。我们假设这样一种情况：战略产消者拥有一个具有可变输出的可再生单元和一个可调度的备用单元，并参与竞争市场。假定产消者通过决定从主电网购买或出售的电量、放弃消耗的可再生电力量以及备用单元产生的电量来最大化其利益。将该模型应用于 IEEE 24 总线 RTS 的案例研究作为说明性示例。我们总结了三个命题中的模型属性和发现，并报告了传统供应商和消费者之间经济租金的分布影响。