Traditionally, energy consumers pay non-commodity charges (e.g., transmission, environmental and network costs) as a major component of their energy bills. With the distributed energy generation, enabling energy consumption close to producers can minimize such costs. The physically constrained energy prosumers in power networks can be logically grouped into virtual microgrids (VMGs) using telecommunication systems. Prosumer benefits can be optimised by modelling the energy trading interactions among producers and consumers in a VMG as a Stackelberg game in which producers lead and consumers follow. Considering renewable (RES) and non-renewable energy (nRES) resources, and given that RES are unpredictable thus unschedulable, we also describe cost and utility models that include load uncertainty demands of producers. The results show that under Stackelberg equilibrium (SE), the costs incurred by a consumer for procuring either the RES or nRES are significantly reduced while the derived utility by producer is maximized. We further show that when the number of prosumers in the VMG increases, the CO ₂ emission cost and consequently the energy cost are minimized at the SE. Lastly, we evaluate the peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading scenario involving noncooperative energy prosumers with and without Stackelberg game. The results show that the P2P energy prosumers attain 47% higher benefits with Stackelberg game.

中文翻译：

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智能电网中虚拟微电网中的能量对等交易：一种博弈论方法

传统上，能源消费者支付非商品费用（例如，传输，环境和网络成本）作为其能源账单的主要组成部分。通过分布式能源生产，使能源消耗接近生产商可以最大程度地降低此类成本。电力网络中受物理限制的能源生产者可以使用电信系统在逻辑上分组为虚拟微电网（VMG）。通过将VMG中生产者和消费者之间的能源交易互动建模为Stackelberg游戏，生产者领导和消费者跟随，可以优化生产者利益。考虑到可再生能源（RES）和不可再生能源（nRES），并且由于RES不可预测，因此无法计划，我们还描述了成本和效用模型，其中包括生产商的负荷不确定性需求。结果表明，在Stackelberg均衡（SE）下，消费者获得RES或nRES的成本大大降低，而生产者的效用最大化。我们进一步证明，当VMG中的生产者数量增加时，CO ₂排放成本，因此能源成本在SE最小。最后，我们评估了涉及有无Stackelberg博弈的非合作能源生产者的对等（P2P）能源交易场景。结果表明，Stackelberg游戏使P2P能源生产者的收益提高了47％。