Congestion game is a widely used model for modern networked applications. A central issue in such applications is that the selfish behavior of the participants may result in resource overloading and negative externalities for the system participants. In this work, we propose a pricing mechanism that guarantees the sub-linear increase of the time-cumulative violation of the resource load constraints. The feature of our method is that it is resource-centric in the sense that it depends on the congestion state of the resources and not on specific characteristics of the system participants. This feature makes our mechanism scalable, flexible, and privacy-preserving. Moreover, we show by numerical simulations that our pricing mechanism has no significant effect on the agents' welfare in contrast to the improvement of the capacity violation.

中文翻译：

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具有有限时间保证的拥塞博弈动态定价的资源感知控制

拥塞博弈是现代网络应用广泛使用的模型。此类应用中的一个核心问题是参与者的自私行为可能导致系统参与者的资源过载和负面外部性。在这项工作中，我们提出了一种定价机制，以保证违反资源负载限制的时间累积违反的次线性增加。我们方法的特点是它以资源为中心，因为它取决于资源的拥塞状态，而不是系统参与者的特定特征。此功能使我们的机制具有可扩展性、灵活性和隐私保护。此外，我们通过数值模拟表明，与容量违规的改善相比，我们的定价机制对代理的福利没有显着影响。