This paper uses a novel experimental design to investigate the strategic value of making a public payoff sacrifice (“burning money”) in a setting modelled after the battle-of-the-sexes game. Unlike prior studies, we find that subjects choose to burn money in a significant portion of decision trials and that burning makes the first movers more likely to achieve their preferred stage two equilibrium outcome. No such effect is observed in a control treatment where money burning is triggered unintentionally. This suggests that payoff sacrifices are important as deliberate signals of one’s further intentions, and can be a source of strategic advantage different from that stemming from being the first party to move. These results are supported by an analysis of subjects’ eye movements, which reveals patterns consistent with forward induction reasoning.

中文翻译：

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论“用脚开枪”的战略价值：烧钱实验研究

本文使用一种新颖的实验设计来研究在模拟性别之战游戏的环境中做出公共回报牺牲（“烧钱”）的战略价值。与之前的研究不同，我们发现受试者在决策试验的很大一部分选择烧钱，烧钱使先行者更有可能实现他们首选的第二阶段平衡结果。在无意触发烧钱的对照治疗中没有观察到这种效果。这表明，牺牲回报是重要的，作为一个人进一步意图的故意信号，并且可以成为不同于作为第一方行动的战略优势的来源。这些结果得到了对受试者眼球运动的分析的支持，该分析揭示了与前向归纳推理一致的模式。