© The Author(s) 2018. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. Emergent technologies, sometimes referred to as Disruptive Digital Technologies (DDTs), including social media, machine-learning, 3-D printing, advanced robotics, unmanned vehicles (drones) and the Internet of Things (IoT), provoke argument over the opportunities for realising “smart cities” but also the threats of introducing new vulnerabilities into the governance and security of city-regions. Given the rapid evolution of these technologies and uncertainty about their likely impact, this special issue invited contributions of a conceptual, methodological and/or empirical focus that consider how social science can better understand and respond to the opportunities and threats of smart cities. The “smart city” is promoted as an unqualified positive development, particularly given pressures for more efficient, economic and effective governance in rapidly expanding cities. However, in the dash for technological fixes to the various pressures of urbanisation, there is a tendency to overlook the security implications of “smarter” critical infrastructure, including its vulnerability to criminal enterprise and terrorist attack. Such reflection is especially pressing if, as suggested by some (Omand 2016), both commercial and governmental dependence on the internet has gone “past the point of inflexion” in the United States as well as in many European countries, and as the migration of critical infrastructure on-line has the potential to accelerate the sociotechnical “arms race” between organisers and preventers of serious crime. The “WannaCry” ransomware attack of May 2017 exemplifies the kind of vulnerabilities that can arise from the dependence on Internet-enabled critical infrastructure envisaged by advocates of the smart city. Amongst its other global effects, this attack compromised a third of English National Health Service information systems over a 72-h period, resulting in the cancellation of 20,000 appointments and operations (Boiten and Wall 2017). Subsequent investigation attributed this to the vulnerability of those healthcare authorities who had not upgraded their obsolete IT operating systems, such as Windows XP, which Microsoft had withdrawn support from 3 years prior to the attack (Dwyer 2018). This and countless other human decisions left unpatched operating systems vulnerable to a relatively unsophisticated virus, indicating the brittle security of critical infrastructure in smart cities. Beyond such exceptional instances of the insecurity of smart cities as the WannaCry attack, it is possible to envisage the proliferation of more mundane and quotidian vulnerabilities. Public policy is, for example, increasingly preoccupied with the vulnerabilities of young people to harmful, every day, social media communications and their alleged impact on mental health and wellbeing (Webb et al. 2015; Housley et al. 2018). Another mundane security concern is the increasing connectivity, and thus vulnerability to hacking, of household appliances through the Internet of Things (IoT). If such threats can be characterised as “new opportunities for new types of crime”, or “true cybercrimes”, that couldn’t exist without the internet, it is also possible to envisage how internet connectivity can “assist existing or ‘ordinary’ crime”, as in the augmentation of the illicit trade in drugs using mobile smart phones (Wall 2010). Smart cities might also facilitate the proliferation of “hybrid cybercrimes” or “new global opportunities for existing or ‘traditional’ crimes”, such as the distribution of extreme pornography across borders (Wall 2010). In these more expansive terms, smart cities and their vulnerabilities are already ubiquitous in continents where Internet usage is estimated at over half of the population (Smith et al. 2015). Given this ubiquity and mindful of the orientation of this journal, the special issue invited reflections on how emergent technologies can alter our understanding of Open Access

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智慧城市与安全：社论序言

© The Author(s) 2018. 本文根据知识共享署名 4.0 国际许可 (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licens ses/by/4.0/) 的条款分发，该许可允许不受限制地使用、分发、并在任何媒体中复制，前提是您适当注明原作者和来源，提供指向知识共享许可的链接，并指出是否进行了更改。新兴技术，有时也称为颠覆性数字技术 (DDT)，包括社交媒体、机器学习、3D 打印、先进机器人、无人驾驶车辆（无人机）和物联网 (IoT)，引发了关于实现“智慧城市”，但也面临将新漏洞引入城市区域治理和安全的威胁。鉴于这些技术的快速发展及其可能影响的不确定性，本期特刊邀请了概念、方法和/或经验重点的贡献，以考虑社会科学如何更好地理解和应对智慧城市的机遇和威胁。“智慧城市”被宣传为一种无条件的积极发展，特别是考虑到在快速扩张的城市中进行更高效、经济和有效治理的压力。然而，在为应对城市化的各种压力而寻求技术修复的过程中，人们倾向于忽视“更智能”的关键基础设施的安全影响，包括其易受犯罪企业和恐怖袭击的影响。如果正如一些人（Omand 2016）所建议的那样，这种反思尤其紧迫，在美国和许多欧洲国家，商业和政府对互联网的依赖已经“超过拐点”，而且随着关键基础设施的在线迁移有可能加速社会技术“军备竞赛”在严重犯罪的组织者和预防者之间。2017 年 5 月发生的“WannaCry”勒索软件攻击就是智慧城市倡导者所设想的对启用互联网的关键基础设施的依赖所导致的漏洞类型。在其其他全球影响中，这次攻击在 72 小时内破坏了英国国民健康服务信息系统的三分之一，导致 20,000 次预约和操作被取消（Biten 和 Wall 2017）。随后的调查将此归因于那些未升级过时 IT 操作系统（例如 Windows XP）的医疗保健机构的漏洞，微软在攻击前 3 年就已撤回支持（Dwyer 2018）。这和无数其他人为决定使未打补丁的操作系统容易受到相对简单的病毒的攻击，这表明智慧城市中关键基础设施的安全性很脆弱。除了像 WannaCry 攻击这样的智慧城市不安全的例外情况之外，还有可能设想更多平凡和日常漏洞的扩散。例如，公共政策越来越关注年轻人每天都容易受到有害的社交媒体传播及其对心理健康和福祉的所谓影响（Webb 等，2017）。2015年；豪斯利等人。2018）。另一个常见的安全问题是通过物联网 (IoT) 连接的家用电器日益增加，因此容易受到黑客攻击。如果这种威胁可以被描述为“新型犯罪的新机会”或“真正的网络犯罪”，如果没有互联网就不可能存在，那么还可以设想互联网连接如何“协助现有或‘普通’犯罪”，例如使用移动智能手机扩大非法毒品贸易（Wall 2010）。智慧城市还可能促进“混合网络犯罪”或“现有或‘传统’犯罪的新全球机会”的扩散，例如跨境传播极端色情内容（Wall 2010）。在这些更广泛的术语中，在互联网使用率估计超过一半人口的大陆，智慧城市及其脆弱性已经无处不在（Smith 等人，2015 年）。鉴于这种普遍性和本刊的定位，特刊邀请反思新兴技术如何改变我们对开放获取的理解