We provide comparable algorithms for the Dekel–Fudenberg procedure, iterated admissibility, proper rationalizability and full permissibility by means of the notions of likelihood orderings and preference restrictions. The algorithms model reasoning processes whereby each player’s preferences over his own strategies are completed by eliminating likelihood orderings. We apply the algorithms for comparing iterated admissibility, proper rationalizability and full permissibility, and provide a sufficient condition under which iterated admissibility does not rule out properly rationalizable strategies. We also use the algorithms to examine an economically relevant strategic situation, namely a bilateral commitment bargaining game. Finally, we discuss the relevance of our algorithms for epistemic analysis.

中文翻译：

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游戏中谨慎推理的算法

我们通过似然排序和偏好限制的概念为 Dekel-Fudenberg 过程、迭代可接纳性、适当合理化和完全可允许性提供了可比较的算法。算法对推理过程进行建模，从而通过消除似然排序来完成每个参与者对其策略的偏好。我们应用算法来比较迭代可容许性、适当合理化和完全容许性，并提供一个充分条件，在此条件下，迭代可容许性不排除适当合理化的策略。我们还使用算法来检查与经济相关的战略情况，即双边承诺讨价还价博弈。最后，我们讨论了我们的算法与认知分析的相关性。