We consider multi-item exchange markets in which agents want to receive one of their target bundles of resources. The model encompasses well-studied markets for kidney exchange, lung exchange, and multi-organ exchange. We identify a general and sufficient condition called weak consistency for the exchange mechanisms to be strategyproof even if we impose any kind of distributional, diversity, or exchange cycle constraints. Within the class of weakly consistent and strategyproof mechanisms, we highlight two important ones that satisfy constrained Pareto optimality and strong individual rationality. Several results in the literature follow from our insights. We also derive impossibility results when constrained Pareto optimality is defined with respect to more permissive individual rationality requirements.

中文翻译：

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一心一意的二分偏好下的战略验证多项目交换

我们考虑了多项目交易市场，代理商希望在该市场中获得其目标资源包之一。该模型涵盖了经过精心研究的肾脏交换，肺交换和多器官交换市场。即使我们施加了任何形式的分布，多样性或交换周期约束，我们也会确定一个称为弱一致性的一般充分条件，以使交换机制具有策略性。在弱一致性和策略验证机制这一类中，我们重点介绍了两个重要的机制，它们满足约束的帕累托最优性和强烈的个人理性。从我们的见解中可以得出文献中的一些结果。当针对更宽松的个人理性要求定义了约束帕累托最优性时，我们也得出不可能结果。