Men and jobs alike are characterized by a single trait , which may take on categorical values according to given population frequencies. Men arrive to the system following a Poisson process and wait till jobs are assigned to them. Jobs arrive to the system following another, independent, Poisson process. An arriving job must be assigned to a waiting man immediately, or be discarded, ensuing no gain. An assignment of a job to a man yields a higher gain if they match in trait, and a lower one if not. Each man waits a limited time for a job and leaves the system if unassigned by that time limit. It is stipulated that a man who arrives first has priority to either accept the pending job, or to pass it to the next man, who makes a similar decision. The last man in the line takes the job, or it is discarded. The individually optimal policy for each man is defined by some critical time for accepting a mismatched job. We solve for the critical times, depending on the mens’ place in the queue, and obtain expressions for the ensuing optimal value functions of this system, for expected gain. The model originates from the utility-equity dilemma in assigning live organs to patients on the national waiting list. The paper reports numerical comparison of the above policy with alternative ones, for several performance measures.

中文翻译：

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不耐烦的公用事业携带队列的基准策略

男人和工作都以单一特征为特征，根据给定的人口频率，这些特征可能具有分类值。男人按照泊松过程到达系统并等待工作分配给他们。作业通过另一个独立的泊松过程到达系统。到达的工作必须立即分配给等待的人，否则将被丢弃，从而没有收益。如果他们在特质上匹配，则将工作分配给男性会产生更高的收益，如果不匹配，则会产生较低的收益。每个人等待工作的时间是有限的，如果在该时间限制之前未分配，则离开系统。规定先到的人有优先权，要么接受待处理的工作，要么将其传递给下一个做出类似决定的人。队列中的最后一个人接受了这份工作，或者它被丢弃了。每个人的个人最优策略是由接受不匹配工作的一些关键时间来定义的。我们根据男性在队列中的位置求解关键时间，并获得该系统随后的最优价值函数的表达式，以获得预期收益。该模型源于将活体器官分配给国家等候名单上的患者的公用事业权益困境。该论文报告了上述政策与替代政策的数值比较，用于几种性能指标。该模型源于将活体器官分配给国家等候名单上的患者的公用事业权益困境。该论文报告了上述政策与替代政策的数值比较，用于几种性能指标。该模型源于将活体器官分配给国家等候名单上的患者的公用事业权益困境。该论文报告了上述政策与替代政策的数值比较，用于几种性能指标。