This paper studies a job market signaling model with imperfect competition among employers. In our basic model, workers are differentiated in productivity and preference over employers, both of which are workers’ private information. We conclude that if competition is sufficiently strong, a separating equilibrium exists. We also show that stronger competition among employers intensifies competition between workers; workers invest more in costly education to get attractive jobs, and social welfare decreases. When employers can observe worker’s preferences, wage discrimination strengthens competition among employers and makes workers better off.

中文翻译：

---

雇主之间不完全竞争的就业市场信号

本文研究了雇主之间不完全竞争的就业市场信号模型。在我们的基本模型中，工人在生产力和对雇主的偏好方面存在差异，这两者都是工人的私人信息。我们得出结论，如果竞争足够强大，就会存在分离均衡。我们还表明，雇主之间更激烈的竞争会加剧工人之间的竞争；工人在昂贵的教育上投资更多以获得有吸引力的工作，社会福利减少。当雇主可以观察工人的偏好时，工资歧视会加强雇主之间的竞争，并使工人的生活变得更好。