Opponents of the computational theory of mind (CTM) have held that the theory is devoid of explanatory content, since whatever computational procedures are said to account for our cognitive attributes will also be realized by a host of other ‘deviant’ physical systems, such as buckets of water and possibly even stones. Such ‘triviality’ claims rely on a simple mapping account (SMA) of physical implementation. Hence defenders of CTM traditionally attempt to block the trivialization critique by advocating additional constraints on the implementation relation. However, instead of attempting to ‘save’ CTM by constraining the account of physical implementation, I argue that the general form of the triviality argument is invalid. I provide a counterexample scenario, and show that SMA is in fact consistent with empirically rich and theoretically plausible versions of CTM. This move requires rejection of the computational sufficiency thesis, which I argue is scientifically unjustified in any case. By shifting the ‘burden of explanatory force’ away from the concept of physical implementation, and instead placing it on salient aspects of the target phenomenon to be explained, it’s possible to retain a maximally liberal and unfettered view of physical implementation, and at the same time defuse the triviality arguments that have motivated defenders of CTM to impose various theory-laden constraints on SMA.

中文翻译：

---

重新考虑琐碎的论点

心智计算理论 (CTM) 的反对者认为该理论缺乏解释性内容，因为任何被称为解释我们认知属性的计算程序也将被许多其他“异常”物理系统实现，例如一桶桶水，甚至可能是石头。这种“琐碎”声明依赖于物理实现的简单映射帐户 (SMA)。因此，CTM 的捍卫者传统上试图通过倡导对实现关系的额外约束来阻止琐碎化的批评。然而，与其试图通过限制物理实现的说明来“拯救”CTM，我认为平凡性论证的一般形式是无效的。我提供了一个反例场景，并表明 SMA 实际上与经验丰富且理论上合理的 CTM 版本一致。此举要求拒绝计算充分性论点，我认为这在任何情况下在科学上都是不合理的。通过将“解释力负担”从物理实现的概念转移开，而是将其放在要解释的目标现象的显着方面，可以最大限度地保留对物理实现的自由和不受约束的观点，同时时间平息了促使 CTM 的捍卫者对 SMA 施加各种充满理论约束的琐碎论点。