Current interest in two-sided markets is motivated by examples of successful practical applications of market mechanisms in supply chain markets, online advertising exchanges, and pollution-rights markets. Many of these examples require markets where agents arrive dynamically and can trade multiple commodities. However, the known literature largely focuses on settings with single-commodity unit demand. We present, prove and evaluate a general solution that matches agents in a dynamic, two-sided combinatorial market. Multiple commodities, each with multiple units, are bought and sold in different bundles by agents that arrive over time. Our mechanism, COMBIMA, provides the first dynamic two-sided combinatorial market that allows truthful and individually-rational behavior for all agents, keeps the market budget balanced and approximates social welfare efficiency. We experimentally examine and compare the allocative efficiency of COMBIMA with respect to our proven theoretical bounds and with respect to all known (dynamic and non-dynamic) social-welfare maximizing two-sided markets under variety of distributions of bids, market demands and market size. COMBIMA performs well by all benchmarks and in many cases improves on previous mechanisms.

中文翻译：

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COMBIMA：真实，预算保持，动态组合市场

市场机制在供应链市场，在线广告交易和污染权市场中成功应用的实例激发了人们对两面市场的兴趣。这些示例中的许多都需要代理商动态到达并可以交易多种商品的市场。然而，已知文献主要集中于具有单一商品单位需求的设置。我们提出，证明和评估在动态的双向组合市场中与代理商匹配的一般解决方案。随时间推移到达的代理商会以不同的捆绑方式买卖每种具有多个单位的多种商品。我们的机制COMBIMA提供了第一个动态的双向组合市场，该市场允许所有特工采取真实且具有独立理性的行为，保持市场预算平衡并近似社会福利效率。我们通过实验来检验和比较COMBIMA相对于我们业已证明的理论界限以及所有已知的（动态和非动态）社会福利最大化分配条件，市场需求和市场规模下的双向市场的分配效率。COMBIMA在所有基准测试中均表现良好，并且在许多情况下改进了以前的机制。