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Prices and subsidies in the sharing economy
Performance Evaluation ( IF 2.2 ) Pub Date : 2019-12-01 , DOI: 10.1016/j.peva.2019.102037 Zhixuan Fang , Longbo Huang , Adam Wierman
Performance Evaluation ( IF 2.2 ) Pub Date : 2019-12-01 , DOI: 10.1016/j.peva.2019.102037 Zhixuan Fang , Longbo Huang , Adam Wierman
Abstract The growth of the sharing economy is driven by the emergence of platforms, e.g., Uber and Lyft, that match owners looking to share their resources with customers looking to rent them. The design of such platforms is a complex mixture of economics and engineering, and how to optimally design such platforms is still an open problem. In this paper, we focus on the design of prices and subsidies in sharing platforms. Our results provide insights into the tradeoff between revenue maximizing prices and social welfare maximizing prices. Specifically, we introduce a novel model of sharing platforms and characterize the profit and social welfare maximizing prices in this model. Further, we bound the efficiency loss under profit maximizing prices, showing that there is a strong alignment between profit and efficiency in practical settings. Our results highlight that the revenue of platforms may be limited in practice due to supply shortages; thus, platforms have a strong incentive to encourage sharing via subsidies. We provide an analytic characterization of when such subsidies are valuable and show how to optimize the size of the subsidy provided. Finally, we validate our results and insights using data from Didi Chuxing, a ridesharing platform in China.
更新日期：2019-12-01
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