In this paper, we introduce a solution concept generalizing the Harsanyi non-transferable utility (NTU) value to cooperative games with incomplete information. The so-defined S-solution is characterized by virtual utility scales that extend the Harsanyi-Shapley fictitious weighted-utility transfer procedure. We construct a three-player cooperative game in which Myerson’s (Int J Game Theory 13(2):69–96, 1984a ) generalization of the Shapley NTU value does not capture some “negative” externality generated by the adverse selection. However, when we explicitly compute the S-solution in this game, it turns out that it prescribes a more intuitive outcome which takes into account the above mentioned informational externality.

中文翻译：

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Harsanyi NTU 值对不完全信息博弈的推广

在本文中，我们引入了一个解决方案概念，将 Harsanyi 不可转移效用 (NTU) 值推广到具有不完整信息的合作博弈。如此定义的 S 解决方案的特点是虚拟效用标度，它扩展了 Harsanyi-Shapley 虚拟加权效用转移程序。我们构建了一个三人合作博弈，其中 Myerson (Int J Game Theory 13(2):69–96, 1984a ) 对 Shapley NTU 值的概括没有捕捉到一些由逆向选择产生的“负”外部性。然而，当我们在这个博弈中明确计算 S 解时，结果表明它规定了一个更直观的结果，它考虑了上述信息外部性。