This paper investigates the problem of the resilient control for cyber-physical systems (CPSs) in the presence of malicious sensor denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, which result in the loss of state information. The concepts of DoS frequency and DoS duration are introduced to describe the DoS attacks. According to the attack situation, that is, whether the attack is successfully implemented or not, the original physical system is rewritten as a switched version. A resilient sliding mode control scheme is designed to guarantee that the physical process is exponentially stable, which is a foundation of the main results. Then, a zero-sum game is employed to establish an effective mixed defense mechanism. Furthermore, a defense-based resilient sliding mode control scheme is proposed and the desired control performance is achieved. Compared with the existing results, the differences mainly lie in two aspects, that is, one where a switched model is obtained, based on which the average dwell-time like approach is utilized to derive the resilient control scheme, and the other where the zero-sum game in employed to make the attacks satisfy the concepts of DoS frequency and DoS duration. Finally, simulation results are given to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed resilient control approach.

中文翻译：

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拒绝服务攻击下基于主动防御的弹性滑模控制


本文研究了在存在恶意传感器拒绝服务（DoS）攻击（导致状态信息丢失）的情况下网络物理系统（CPS）的弹性控制问题。引入DoS频率和DoS持续时间的概念来描述DoS攻击。根据攻击情况，即攻击是否成功实施，将原有的物理系统重写为切换版本。设计了弹性滑模控制方案来保证物理过程指数稳定，这是主要结果的基础。然后，采用零和博弈建立有效的混合防御机制。此外，提出了一种基于防御的弹性滑模控制方案，并实现了预期的控制性能。与现有结果相比，差异主要在于两个方面，一是获得切换模型，在此基础上利用类平均驻留时间方法推导弹性控制方案，二是零采用求和博弈使攻击满足DoS频率和DoS持续时间的概念。最后，给出仿真结果来证明所提出的弹性控制方法的有效性。