Lightweight cryptography has become more and more important in recent years because of the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT) and usage of smart mobile devices. In this paper, we propose a novel secure lightweight entity authentication hardware primitive called SLATE, where its area is about 50% to more than 3X smaller than existing lightweight ciphers and strong physical unclonable functions (PUFs), respectively. Even though the authentication of SLATE is done through challenge response pair (CRP) verification similar to strong PUFs, the source of the key for SLATE must be coming from any existing secret key storage used for any ciphers. A main advantage of SLATE over most existing strong PUFs being an entity authentication primitive is that SLATE is resistant to known attacks to strong PUFs or logic obfuscations, such as model building attacks and Boolean satisfiability (SAT) attacks. Furthermore, we show that the implementation cost of SLATE with a 176-bit key and 244 CRPs is only 663 gate equivalents (GEs). Compared with lightweight ciphers and existing secure strong PUFs, we show that SLATE is a practical security primitive for resource constrained systems for its extremely small footprint and security. Finally, we show that SLATE is information theoretically secure when valid CRPs are communicated through insecure channels.

中文翻译：

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SLATE：安全的轻量级实体身份验证硬件原语


近年来，由于物联网 (IoT) 的兴起和智能移动设备的使用，轻量级密码学变得越来越重要。在本文中，我们提出了一种名为 SLATE 的新型安全轻量级实体身份验证硬件原语，其面积分别比现有轻量级密码和强物理不可克隆函数 (PUF) 小约 50% 至 3 倍以上。尽管 SLATE 的身份验证是通过类似于强 PUF 的质询响应对 (CRP) 验证来完成的，但 SLATE 的密钥来源必须来自用于任何密码的任何现有密钥存储。与大多数现有的强 PUF 作为实体身份验证原语相比，SLATE 的主要优点是 SLATE 能够抵抗对强 PUF 或逻辑混淆的已知攻击，例如模型构建攻击和布尔可满足性 (SAT) 攻击。此外，我们还表明，具有 176 位密钥和 244 个 CRP 的 SLATE 的实现成本仅为 663 个门当量 (GE)。与轻量级密码和现有的安全强 PUF 相比，我们证明 SLATE 因其极小的占用空间和安全性而成为资源受限系统的实用安全原语。最后，我们证明当有效的 CRP 通过不安全的通道进行通信时，SLATE 在理论上是安全的信息。