We theoretically examine the gains of the decentralisation of agri-environmental policy design. We consider a model with homogeneous regions and joint production of local and global public goods from agriculture. Assuming that governments are characterised by different agency costs and knowledge of the PG values, we evaluate whether decentralisation is a suitable strategy to improve the efficiency of agri-environmental payments. We find that partial decentralisation always improves the welfare. We apply our theoretical model to the case of abandoned wetlands in Brittany. We find that national governments are the most suitable to design agri-environmental policies. Our results contribute to reflections on future Common Agricultural Policy.

中文翻译：

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农业环境政策设计的权力下放

我们从理论上考察了农业环境政策设计权力下放的收益。我们考虑一个模型，该模型具有相同的地区，并通过农业联合生产本地和全球公共产品。假设政府具有不同的代理成本和对PG值的了解，我们评估权力下放是否是提高农业环境支付效率的合适策略。我们发现部分分权总是可以改善福利。我们将理论模型应用于布列塔尼废弃湿地的案例。我们发现，各国政府最适合设计农业环境政策。我们的结果有助于对未来的共同农业政策进行反思。