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Making an Example: Signalling Threat in the Evolution of Cooperation
arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory Pub Date : 2020-01-22 , DOI: arxiv-2001.08245
Theodor Cimpeanu and The Anh Han

Social punishment has been suggested as a key approach to ensuring high levels of cooperation and norm compliance in one-shot (i.e. non-repeated) interactions. However, it has been shown that it only works when punishment is highly cost-efficient. On the other hand, signalling retribution hearkens back to medieval sovereignty, insofar as the very word for gallows in French stems from the Latin word for power and serves as a grim symbol of the ruthlessness of high justice. Here we introduce the mechanism of signalling an act of punishment and a special type of defector emerges, one who can recognise this signal and avoid punishment by way of fear. We describe the analytical conditions under which threat signalling can maintain high levels of cooperation. Moreover, we perform extensive agent-based simulations so as to confirm and expand our understanding of the external factors that influence the success of social punishment. We show that our suggested mechanism catalyses cooperation, even when signalling is costly or when punishment would be impractical. We observe the preventive nature of advertising retributive acts and we contend that the resulting social prosperity is a desirable outcome in the contexts of AI and multi-agent systems. To conclude, we argue that fear acts as an effective stimulus to pro-social behaviour.

中文翻译:

举个例子:在合作的演变中发出威胁信号

社会惩罚被认为是确保一次性(即非重复)互动中高度合作和规范遵守的关键方法。然而,事实证明,它只有在惩罚具有很高的成本效益时才有效。另一方面,信号报应让人回想起中世纪的主权,因为法语中绞刑架这个词源于拉丁语中的权力,并且是最高正义无情的冷酷象征。在这里,我们介绍了一种惩罚行为的信号机制,一种特殊类型的叛逃者出现了,他们可以识别这种信号并通过恐惧来逃避惩罚。我们描述了威胁信号可以保持高水平合作的分析条件。而且,我们进行了广泛的基于代理的模拟,以确认和扩展我们对影响社会惩罚成功的外部因素的理解。我们表明,我们建议的机制可以促进合作,即使在发出信号成本高或惩罚不切实际的情况下也是如此。 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 我们观察到广告报复行为的预防性质,我们认为由此产生的社会繁荣是人工智能和多代理系统背景下的理想结果。总之,我们认为恐惧是对亲社会行为的有效刺激。我们观察到广告报复行为的预防性质,我们认为由此产生的社会繁荣是人工智能和多代理系统背景下的理想结果。总之,我们认为恐惧是对亲社会行为的有效刺激。我们观察到广告报复行为的预防性质,我们认为由此产生的社会繁荣是人工智能和多代理系统背景下的理想结果。总之,我们认为恐惧是对亲社会行为的有效刺激。
更新日期:2020-01-30
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