Bitcoin-NG is among the first blockchain protocols to approach the \emph{near-optimal} throughput by decoupling blockchain operation into two planes: leader election and transaction serialization. Its decoupling idea has inspired a new generation of high-performance blockchain protocols. However, the existing incentive analysis of Bitcoin-NG has several limitations. First, the impact of network capacity is ignored. Second, an integrated incentive analysis that jointly considers both key blocks and microblocks is still missing. In this paper, we aim to address these two limitations. First, we propose a new incentive analysis that takes the network capacity into account, showing that Bitcoin-NG can still maintain incentive compatibility against the microblock mining attack even under limited network capacity. Second, we leverage a Markov decision process (MDP) to jointly analyze the incentive of both key blocks and microblocks, showing that the selfish mining revenue of Bitcoin-NG is a little higher than that in Bitcoin only when the selfish miner controls more than 35\% of the mining power. We hope that our in-depth incentive analysis for Bitcoin-NG can shed some light on the mechanism design and incentive analysis of next-generation blockchain protocols.

中文翻译：

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重新审视 Bitcoin-NG 的激励分析

Bitcoin-NG 是第一个通过将区块链操作解耦为两个平面来接近 \emph{near-optimal} 吞吐量的区块链协议之一：领导者选举和交易序列化。其解耦思想启发了新一代高性能区块链协议。然而，现有的 Bitcoin-NG 激励分析有几个局限性。首先，忽略了网络容量的影响。其次，仍然缺少联合考虑关键区块和微区块的综合激励分析。在本文中，我们旨在解决这两个限制。首先，我们提出了一种新的考虑网络容量的激励分析，表明即使在有限的网络容量下，Bitcoin-NG 仍然可以保持对微区块挖掘攻击的激励兼容性。第二，我们利用马尔可夫决策过程（MDP）联合分析关键块和微块的激励，表明只有当自私矿工控制超过 35% 时，Bitcoin-NG 的自私挖矿收益才略高于比特币的挖矿能力。我们希望我们对 Bitcoin-NG 的深入激励分析可以为下一代区块链协议的机制设计和激励分析提供一些启示。