An important question in a software economy is how to incentivize deep rather than shallow fixes. A deep fix corrects the root cause of a bug instead of suppressing the symptoms. This paper initiates the study of the problem of incentive design for open workflows in fixing code. We model the dynamics of the software ecosystem and introduce subsumption mechanisms. These mechanisms only make use of externally observable information in determining payments and promote competition between workers. We use a mean field equilibrium methodology to evaluate the performance of these mechanisms, demonstrating in simulation that subsumption mechanisms perform robustly across various environment configurations and satisfy important criteria for market design.

中文翻译：

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激励软件经济体的深度修复

软件经济中的一个重要问题是如何激励深层而不是浅层修复。深度修复可以纠正错误的根本原因，而不是抑制症状。本文开始研究修复代码中开放工作流的激励设计问题。我们对软件生态系统的动态进行建模并引入包含机制。这些机制仅利用外部可观察的信息来确定付款并促进工人之间的竞争。我们使用平均场均衡方法来评估这些机制的性能，在模拟中证明包容机制在各种环境配置中表现强劲，并满足市场设计的重要标准。