Revocable identity based signature (RIBS) is a useful cryptographic primitive, which provides a revocation mechanism to revoke misbehaving or malicious users over ID-based public key settings. In the past, many RIBS schemes have been previously proposed, but the security of all these existing schemes is based on traditional complexity assumptions, which are not secure against attacks in the quantum era. Lattice-based cryptography has many attractive features and it is all believed to be secure against attacks of quantum computing. Recently, Hung et al. proposed a RIBS with short size over lattices. However, in their scheme, it requires the private key generator (PKG) to perform linear work in the number of users and does not scale well. Moreover, their scheme is secure in the random oracle model. In this paper, we adopt the binary tree structure to present a scalable lattice-based RIBS scheme which greatly reduces the PKG’S workload associated with users from linear to logarithm. We prove that our proposed scheme is existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA) under standard short integer solutions (SIS) assumption, in the standard model. Compared with the existing RIBS schemes over lattices, our proposed RIBS construction is secure in the standard model with scalability and meanwhile has efficient revocation mechanism with public channels.

基于可撤销身份的签名（RIBS）是一种有用的加密原语，它提供了一种撤消机制，以通过基于ID的公钥设置撤消行为不端或恶意用户。过去，以前已经提出了许多RIBS方案，但是所有这些现有方案的安全性都是基于传统的复杂性假设，而这些假设对于量子时代的攻击是不安全的。基于格的加密具有许多吸引人的功能，并且据信所有这些都可以安全地抵抗量子计算的攻击。最近，洪等人。提出了一种在格子上尺寸短的RIBS。但是，在他们的方案中，它要求私钥生成器（PKG）在用户数量上执行线性工作，并且扩展性不好。而且，他们的方案在随机预言模型中是安全的。在本文中，我们采用二叉树结构来提出一种基于可伸缩网格的RIBS方案，该方案从线性到对数极大地减少了与用户相关的PKG的工作量。我们证明了在标准模型中，在标准短整数解决方案（SIS）假设下，我们提出的方案对于选定的消息攻击（EUF-CMA）而言是不可伪造的。与现有的基于网格的RIBS方案相比，我们提出的RIBS构造在标准模型中是安全的，具有可伸缩性，同时具有有效的公共通道吊销机制。在标准模型中。与现有的基于网格的RIBS方案相比，我们提出的RIBS构造在标准模型中具有可伸缩性是安全的，同时具有有效的公共通道撤销机制。在标准模型中。与现有的基于网格的RIBS方案相比，我们提出的RIBS构造在标准模型中是安全的，具有可伸缩性，同时具有有效的公共通道吊销机制。