Crop insurance may affect harvested acreage and yield by influencing producers’ behavior such as land allocation and input use. Although specialty crops are a major source of farm income, especially on the U.S. west coast, they have not received as much attention as field crops in previous empirical studies. This paper assesses the effect of moral hazard and adverse selection associated with the federal crop insurance program (FCIP) on the acreage and yield of major specialty crops in California. An econometric method that expands the switching regression model is developed to assess the effect. Results suggest that federal crop insurance can change specialty crop growers’ production responses to climate and soil conditions. The moral hazard effect tends to increase the acreage and yield of the specialty crops, whereas the adverse selection effect tends to have the opposite effect. The overall effect of the FCIP on acreage and yield of specialty crops is found to be moderate.

中文翻译：

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评估联邦作物保险供应对特种作物的面积和单产的影响

作物保险可能会通过影响生产者的行为（如土地分配和投入使用）来影响收获的面积和单产。尽管特种作物是农业收入的主要来源，尤其是在美国西海岸，但在以前的实证研究中，它们没有像田间作物那样受到广泛关注。本文评估了与联邦作物保险计划（FCIP）相关的道德风险和逆向选择对加利福尼亚主要特种作物的种植面积和产量的影响。开发了扩展转换回归模型的计量经济学方法来评估效果。结果表明，联邦作物保险可以改变特种作物种植者对气候和土壤条件的生产反应。道德风险效应往往会增加特种作物的播种面积和单产，相反，逆向选择效果往往具有相反的效果。发现FCIP对特种作物的面积和产量的总体影响是中等的。