ABSTRACT

Psychological theories posit that affective experiences can be decomposed into component constituents, yet disagree on the level of representation of these components. Affective experiences have been previously described as emerging from core dimensions of valence and arousal. However, this view needs to be reconciled with accounts of valence processing in appetitive and aversive circuits from the neuroscience literature. Here we offer an account of affect that allows for both perspectives but compares across levels of analysis. At one level of analysis, valence and arousal are observed already in the properties of encountered stimuli and the appetitive and aversive neural circuits that engage accordingly. At another level of analysis, the explicit experiential aspect of affective processes are compressed and appraised in a manner that allows these experiences to be organized along valence and arousal axes. We review both the behavioral neuroscience evidence on appetitive and aversive circuits as well as the cognitive neuroscience literature on compression in information coding across multiple domains of processing. We argue that these processes are domain-general and adapt these principles to provide a perspective on how valence can be represented at multiple scales in the brain.

摘要

心理学理论认为情感体验可以分解为组成成分，但在这些成分的表征水平上存在分歧。情感体验以前被描述为来自效价和唤醒的核心维度。然而，这种观点需要与神经科学文献中关于食欲和厌恶电路中的价处理的说明相一致。在这里，我们提供了一个考虑到两种观点但跨分析级别进行比较的影响的说明。在一个分析水平上，已经在遇到的刺激的特性以及相应参与的食欲和厌恶的神经回路中观察到效价和唤醒。在另一个层次的分析中，情感过程的明确体验方面被压缩和评估，以允许这些体验沿着效价和唤醒轴进行组织。我们回顾了关于食欲和厌恶电路的行为神经科学证据，以及关于跨多个处理领域的信息编码压缩的认知神经科学文献。我们认为这些过程是领域通用的，并调整这些原则以提供关于如何在大脑中的多个尺度上表示价的观点。