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Do government audits reduce dengue? Estimating the impact of federal monitoring lotteries program on dengue incidence.
International Journal of Health Economics and Management ( IF 1.837 ) Pub Date : 2018-12-17 , DOI: 10.1007/s10754-018-9259-7
Gisléia Benini Duarte 1 , André de Souza Melo 1 , Diego Firmino Costa da Silva 1
Affiliation  

The paper examines the relationship between the supervision carried out in the municipalities by the main Brazilan supervisory institution (Controladoria Geral da UniãoCGU, in portuguese) and the incidence of dengue cases in them. Since the audited municipalities were randomized, this allows the identification of a control group that adequately represents the counterfactual of the treated group. The sample was composed of all municipalities that could be selected for that CGU inspection cycle, that is, 1520 municipalities, of which 70 were drawn and therefore belong to the study treatment group. We identified a negative effect of the policy on the incidence of the disease. However, when we consider a model with lags, we note that this initial impact from the drawing did not persist throughout the year of the inspection. Our analysis suggests that when federal resources are monitored, municipalities reduce irregularities, which may contribute to a decrease in the number of dengue cases.

中文翻译:

政府审计能减少登革热吗?估计联邦监测彩票计划对登革热发病率的影响。

本文研究了巴西主要监管机构 ( Controladoria Geral da UniãoCGU ) 在市政当局进行的监管之间的关系, 在葡萄牙语中) 以及其中登革热病例的发病率。由于被审计的城市是随机的,这允许确定一个充分代表治疗组反事实的对照组。样本由该 CGU 检查周期可以选择的所有城市组成,即 1520 个城市,其中抽取了 70 个城市,因此属于研究治疗组。我们确定了该政策对疾病发病率的负面影响。然而,当我们考虑一个有滞后的模型时,我们注意到绘图的这种初始影响并没有在整个检查年度持续存在。我们的分析表明,当监测联邦资源时,市政当局会减少违规行为,这可能有助于减少登革热病例的数量。
更新日期:2018-12-17
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