Debate about cognitive science explanations has been formulated in terms of identifying the proper level(s) of explanation. Views range from reductionist, favoring only neuroscience explanations, to mechanist, favoring the integration of multiple levels, to pluralist, favoring the preservation of even the most general, high‐level explanations, such as those provided by embodied or dynamical approaches. In this paper, we challenge this framing. We suggest that these are not different levels of explanation at all but, rather, different styles of explanation that capture different, cross‐cutting patterns in cognitive phenomena. Which pattern is explanatory depends on both the cognitive phenomenon under investigation and the research interests occasioning the explanation. This reframing changes how we should answer the basic questions of which cognitive science approaches explain and how these explanations relate to one another. On this view, we should expect different approaches to offer independent explanations in terms of their different focal patterns and the value of those explanations to partly derive from the broad patterns they feature.

中文翻译：

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认知现象的模式和解释风格的多元化。

关于认知科学解释的争论是根据确定解释的适当水平而制定的。观点范围从还原论（仅支持神经科学解释）到机械论（支持多个层次的整合）到多元论（支持保留甚至最一般的高级解释，例如由具身或动态方法提供的解释）。在本文中，我们挑战了这种框架。我们认为，这些根本不是不同层次的解释，而是不同的解释风格，它们捕捉了认知现象中不同的、跨领域的模式。哪种模式是可解释的，取决于所研究的认知现象和引起解释的研究兴趣。这种重构改变了我们应该如何回答认知科学方法解释的基本问题以及这些解释如何相互关联。根据这种观点，我们应该期待不同的方法根据其不同的焦点模式提供独立的解释，并且这些解释的价值部分来自于它们所具有的广泛模式。