In the theoretical literature on moral responsibility, one sometimes comes across cases of manipulated agents. In cases of this type, the agent is a victim of wholesale manipulation, involving the implantation of various pro-attitudes (desires, values, etc.) along with the deletion of competing pro-attitudes. As a result of this manipulation, the agent ends up performing some action unlike any that she would have performed were it not for the manipulation. These sorts of cases are sometimes thought to motivate historical views of responsibility, on which the agent’s past is relevant to whether she is responsible for a specific action. In a recent paper, Daniel Sharp and David Wasserman bring these theoretical discussions on moral responsibility to bear on practical issues regarding neurological modifications of individuals. After proposing and arguing for a historical view, Sharp and Wasserman offer some insight into how such a view may help us in determining the responsibility of subjects who have undergone Deep Brain Stimulation. This paper aims to join this discussion, by arguing that the correct historical view to be applied will also appeal to the agent’s control over her mental life and the fact that this was bypassed. I conclude with some brief comments on the practical implications of such a historical view.

中文翻译：

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大脑干预、道德责任和对精神生活的控制。

在有关道德责任的理论文献中，有时会遇到被操纵的代理人的案例。在这种类型的情况下，代理人是大规模操纵的受害者，涉及植入各种支持态度（欲望、价值观等）以及删除竞争性支持态度。由于这种操纵，特工最终执行了一些与如果没有操纵则她会执行的任何动作不同的动作。这类案件有时被认为激发了责任的历史观，在这种观点中，特工的过去与她是否对特定行动负责有关。在最近的一篇论文中，丹尼尔·夏普和大卫·沃瑟曼将这些关于道德责任的理论讨论应用于有关个人神经学改变的实际问题。在提出并论证了一种历史观点之后，夏普和沃瑟曼就这种观点如何帮助我们确定接受过深部脑刺激的受试者的责任提供了一些见解。本文旨在加入这一讨论，认为所应用的正确历史观也将诉诸代理人对其精神生活的控制以及这一点被绕过的事实。最后，我对这种历史观点的实际影响进行一些简短的评论。