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A Way Forward Beyond Karl Popper's and Donald T. Campbell's Dead-End Evolutionary Epistemologies.
American Journal of Psychology ( IF 0.9 ) Pub Date : 2016-01-01 , DOI: 10.5406/amerjpsyc.129.4.0461
John Wettersten 1
Affiliation  

Theories of natural thought processes have traditionally served as foundations for philosophies of science. The source of all knowledge is passively received observations; these are combined to produce certain knowledge. After David Hume showed that this was not possible, deductivist alternatives, that is, theories that find a source of knowledge in ideas not derived from observations, from Immanuel Kant to William Whewell in the mid-1 9th century, were introduced. In response, traditional associationist and inductivist views were refurbished; a deductivist alternative was developed by the W6rzburg School. Much later Karl Popper in philosophy and Donald T. Campbell in psychology integrated this view with evolutionary theory. Campbell wanted thereby to find a justificationist view, which would reduce philosophy of science to cognitive psychology; Popper rejected both justificationism and the reduction of philosophy of science to psychology. Campbell thought all rational processes were innate psychological processes; Popper thought psychological processes were used to develop various rational processes. Campbell could not show that all rational thought was reducible to innate psychological processes, nor how some justification of scientific theories was possible. Popper could not show how evolutionary theory contributed to our knowledge of psychological thought processes. Both failed to observe that cognitive processes are social; people have learned how to think by learning how to interact in social groups seeking understanding. When innate thought processes are studied as social characteristics, evolutionary theory can contribute to both cognitive psychology and the theory of rationality, as both Popper and Campbell wanted it to do.

中文翻译:

超越卡尔·波普(Karl Popper)和唐纳德·坎贝尔(Donald T.Campbell)的“死胡同”的进化认识论。

自然思维过程的理论传统上一直是科学哲学的基础。所有知识的来源都是被动获得的观察;这些结合起来产生一定的知识。在大卫·休ume(David Hume)证明不可能做到这一点之后,就引入了演绎主义的替代方法,即在9世纪中叶的伊曼纽尔·康德(Immanuel Kant)到威廉·惠威尔(William Whewell)的理论中,这些理论在并非源自观察的思想中寻找知识的来源。作为回应,传统的协会主义和归纳主义的观点得到了翻新。W6rzburg学校开发了一种演绎主义的选择。后来哲学界的卡尔·波普尔和心理学界的唐纳德·T·坎贝尔将这一观点与进化论相结合。坎贝尔因此希望找到一种辩护主义的观点,它将科学哲学简化为认知心理学。波普尔既拒绝称义主义,也拒绝将科学哲学简化为心理学。坎贝尔认为所有理性过程都是与生俱来的心理过程。波普尔认为心理过程被用来发展各种理性过程。坎贝尔不能证明所有理性的思想都可以归结为先天的心理过程,也不能证明科学理论的合理性是如何可能的。波普尔无法证明进化论是如何促进我们对心理思维过程的认识的。他们都没有注意到认知过程是社会性的。人们已经学会了如何在寻求理解的社会群体中进行互动,从而学会了思考。当将先天思维过程作为社会特征进行研究时,进化论可以对认知心理学和理性理论做出贡献,
更新日期:2019-11-01
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